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Out of the Ashes: The Steelworkers'
Global Campaign at
Bridgestone/Firestone
Tom Juravich and Kate Bronfenbrenner
The demonstrations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle
in the fall of 1999 brought together a diverse group of trade unionists,
environmentalists, and anticorporate groups in a historic gathering. The size and
the intensity of the action, coupled with the news and commentary in the weeks
that followed, signaled a new and growing consciousness in the American public
about economic globalization and its consequences. Indeed, the Seattle
demonstrations marked a recognition that today's Nikes, Microsofts, and
General Electrics represent new forms of global corporations fundamentally
different from those of the past. The emergence of these megalithic structures
has triggered renewed calls for global solidarity, for if the nature of capital has
transmogrified in a new global order, then unions, environmental groups, and
economic justice organizations can no longer be effective organizing on a
. national level. Labor and its allies must also build a global network.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how unions and their allies
can build global networks in the face of multinational company (MNC) efforts
to deny workers their rights to representation and destroy the very unions that
represent them. In particular, we examine the strike and the global contract
campaign orchestrated by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) against
the Japanese-owned Bridgestone/Firestone company. The original strike, called
by the United Rubberworkers (URW), had ended disastrously with an
unconditional return to work, foreshadowing the deunionization of the entire tire
industry. After merging with the Rubberworkers, the USWA mounted the
largest and most comprehensive global campaign to date and, with its victory
two years later, brought its new members at Bridgestone/Firestone out of the
ashes of a certain and devastating defeat back into union jobs. We use this
campaign to assess the key elements of a highly successful union strategy and
from it to suggest what is becoming an emerging model of union global strategic
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campaigns in the face of human resource management and labor relations
(HRM/LR) strategies pursued by MNCs to marginalize, if not to destroy, unions.
Our analysis is based largely on face-to-face interviews conducted with
more than 50 participants in the Bridgestone/Firestone struggle. The
interviewees ranged from top international staff and local officers to rank-and-
file activists and community supporters. In addition to the interviews, we
examined key union and company documents trom the files of the USW A
international office and the URW archives, as well as from the four local unions
on strike against Bridgestone/Firestone. We also compiled and studied an
extensive collection of media coverage of the strike and the subsequent global
contract campaign.I We begin by tracing the evolution of labor relations at
Bridgestone/Firestone, highlighting the HRM/LR and negotiation strategies
pursued by the company that set the stage for confrontation with the URW.
Second, we describe the birth of a new union global campaign that emerges
following the merger of the URW and the USWA. Here, we focus on the
essential elements of the USWA strategy; based on research, on constant
escalation of external and internal resistance, and on the widespread
involvement and mobilization of members, their families and communities,and,
.
importantly, their allies from abroad. We close by summarizing the lessons
learned from the USW A victory over Bridgestone/Firestone, suggesting an
emerging model of union power in a global economy.
THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR RELATIONS AT BRIDGESTONElFlRESTONE
Founded in 1900, the Firestone company grew in tandem with the
bourgeoning auto industry. Bolstered by an increase in wartime production, by
1926 Firestone employed more than 20,000 workers (Firestone, 1926:136). In
the postwar era, Firestone would remain among the top tire producers in the
United States. During this same period Bridgestone began as a family business
in Japan that in 1931 was transformed into the Bridgestone Tire Company by
Shorijiro Ishibashi. By the mid-1950s, Bridgestone had become Japan's largest
tire manufacturer.
While Bridgestone's profits and production continued to grow rapidly
throughout the 1970s, by the end of the decade the U.S. tire industry was in
trouble. Aging plants, coupled with the costly changeover to production of
radial tires, left companies such as Firestone in serious financial difficulty.
Firestone closed a number of its plants and laid off half its workforce. As part
of this major reorganization effort, Firestone put its radial tire plant in La
Vergne, Tennessee, on the block. The La Vergne plant was quickly purchased
by the Bridgestone company, which saw it as an opportunity to move into the
U.S. market. This left Firestone with only five plants in the United States:
Decatur, Illinois; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Des Moines, Iowa; Noblesville,
Indiana; and Akron, Ohio. Firestone continued to struggle and in 1988 was
purchased by Bridgestone for U.S.$2.6 billion.
According to industry expert Mary Walton, "The news was greeted
with considerable enthusiasm by most of Firestone's 53,500 employees; exactly
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:ompany grew in tandem with the
increase in wartime production, by
,
workers (Firestone, 1926: 136). In
mong the top tire producers in the
Igestone began as a family business
the Bridgestone Tire Company by
gestone had become Japan's largest
half the 107,000 who had worked for the company as recently as 1979, before
all but five North American plants were closed" (Walton, 1990: 197). Despite
ambitious plans for the newly merged company, BridgestonelFirestone struggled
in its first years to absorb the debt from the Firestone purchase. The new
Bridgestone management was also confronted with the need for extensive
modernization of a number of the Firestone plants, which required them to
allocate $1.5 billion for modernization within the first three years after the
merger. Making matters worse, General Motors dropped the company as a
supplier of automobile tires (Balfour, et aI., 1999: 14). After losing more than
U.S.$1 billion between 1989 and 1991, by 1992 Bridgestone/Firestone began to
turn the comer, both in profits and in U.S. market share.
Central to Bridgestone's integration of the Firestone facilities and
workers into its larger corporate structure and the return to profitability was the
introduction of a new management philosophy, with an emphasis on employee
involvement and new work systems. One of the Bridgestone/Firestone local
union leaders described the changes:
Bridgestone came on board and in 1988 negotiations they introduced us to their new
theme of cooperative management. We were introduced to Quality Circles, Employee
Participation Teams, limited self supervision and other soothing, honey-coated programs.
They talked of "life-time employment," never any layoffs, etc. and we bought into these
ideas because, quite fumkly, the majority of our workers thought aloud "it's worth a try"
and "what have we got to lose'?" And after aU, they said we would no longer be referred
to as employees, now we would be "ASSOCIATES." For the next couple of years we
have a scramble of employees (oops!-ASSOCIATES) standing in line to become Team
members and Team leaders. (Lessin, 1988: 9)
According to Lessin, the range of activities in these areas was dizzying:
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BridgestonelFirestone put employees through hours of training on "Total Quality
Control" (TQc) with specific sections on TQC Problem Solving, brainstorming, the
"PDCA cycle" (plan, do, check, act); Decision-making Prioritizing Checklist; Idea
Growers and Idea Killers; Deming's 5W's and IH: (who, what, where, when, why, how);
Pareto Diagrams; Fishbone Diagrams; Problem Causation; Histograms; Flow charts; and
Problem-solving exercises. (Lessin, 1998: 11)
Much of the activity centered on the Partnership for Involvement
program. This program was discussed as part of bargaining in 1991 and was
included in a Memorandmn of Understanding in the final contract. The
language is fairly typical of these kinds of efforts:
n.
[The] Partnership for involvement Mission Statement recognizes that our employees are
our most important resource, our mission is to promote the safety, standard of living and
quality of work life of all employees. Together we shall strive to insure continuous
improvement in the quality of our products, better service to our customers and increased
profitability of our company. ("Memorandum of Understanding," 1991: 1-2)
The agreement was seen as a model of cooperation for the entire
industry and received the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Director's
Award for Excellence in Industrial Relations ("Bridgestone/Firestone Fact
Sheet," 1995). Bridgestone was back in the black, its market share was
y Walton, "The news was greeted
."estone's 53,500 employees; exactly
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increasing, and it was building a stronger and more productive relationship with
its workers and their union, the URW, through employee involvement and new
work systems. The future appeared bright.
While these changes were taking place on the shop floor, Yoichiro
Kaizaki moved into the top management position at Bridgestone/Firestone.
Balfour, et al., describe the changes:
According to one industryanalyst, Kaizaki, a 30-yearBridgestoneveteran,was "sent as
the agent of change." Armed with his reputationas the "ichiban" (number one) tough
member of Bridgestone's hierarchy developedfrom his aggressiveterminationof losing
operations and his relentless cost cutting ability, Kaizaki's presence would soon be felt by
all. Accordingto a 1992interview,Kaizakiexplained,throughhis translator,"of the four
Ms, material,machine,method,and man, only this last one is differentfrom our Japanese
factories. We must focus on that." (Balfour,et aI., 1999:13)
During the same period that the company was touting cooperation on
the shop floor, in the 1993 negotiations with the La Vergne local, the company,
under Kaizaki's leadership, pushed for major concessions, threatening to close
the plant if labor costs could not be lowered significantly. The local union.
struck for more than two weeks. Management's response to the strike proved
that Bridgestone/Firestone's new Japanese management was no stranger to the
kinds of aggressive antiunion tactics that had become so pervasive in the 1980s
and 1990s in the United States. Former URW president, Ken Coss, remembers:
"They put up guns on top of buildings, sandbags around. I mean, here's a place
where they're supposed to have this cooperative joint-venture type of a location,
and one of the first things is they [have] armed people roaming around in the
plant. They had sandbags, they had gun emplacement on top of buildings" (Ken
Coss interview, 1999:p. 9).
As the company prepared for the major negotiations in 1994, what it
had begun in La Vergne continued. Much of the focus was on merging the
master agreement and local supplemental agreements into one master contract.
Decatur local president Roger Gates recalls, "They just went through our
agreement and just ripped page after page out of it. They literally wiped out all
the local language. And then of course from that they went on to work on the
master language. So they just raped the agreement" (Roger Gates interview,
1999: 5-6).
Many might see this as the kind of hard bargaining that is a common
occurrence in contract negotiations, especially with an industrial company
struggling to get back on its feet. As in all negotiations, there would still be
plenty of room for the company to move later in the bargaining process. The
information that the Rubberworkers were receiving from their union contacts in
other tire plants warned them that Bridgestone/Firestone's intentions went
beyond traditional hard bargaining. The union quickly came to understand that
Bridgestone/Firestone was using these demands to force a strike as part of an
industry-wide effort to break pattern bargaining in the tire industry and severely
weaken the URW's power and influence in the process. La Vergne local
president Tommy Powell describes one of these reports:
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more productive relationship with
~hemployee involvement and new
We got word trom Goodyear's corporate people. They contacted us, which they had
always been great to work with, negotiate within the Rubberworkers' contracts in their
chain. They called and said, "Look, Bridgestone's out beating the bushes. Want some of
us to form a pact. They're willing to take you on at the International, to strike you, and
they want us to help supply tires to them in addition to what they're going to supply to
help keep their customers going while they destroy you all. We want you to know that
we're not going to be a part of that." So they refused to be a part of it. (Powell interview,
1999: 14-15)
Despite Bridgestone/Firestone's failure to gain the full support of the tire
industry giants, it pressed on with its campaign against the union in what in
industry circles had already been secretly dubbed the "War of 94"
(Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998: 21).
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The events at Bridgestone/Firestone provide an important opportunity
to examine how unions function in the new global economy. Many have
suggested that to gain power and restrain employers from moving production
overseas or engagmg m aggressive antiunion practices, unions and their
members must prove that they are indispensable through a full commitment to
new, more cooperative and productive work practices (e.g., see Cohen-
Rosenfeld and Burton, 1987; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Hecksher, 1996,
1998; Appelbaum et aI., 2000). Heckscher provides the basic tenets of this
approach:
First, institutions of worker representation cannot survive unless they are widely
perceivedas contributingto economicgrowthas well as economicjustice. Seconct alld
related-unions can succeedonly if they essentiallycontributeto goodmanagement-'--not
if they fundamentallyundermine it. In fact, by making deals which are in the long-term
interestsof managementas well as employees,they force managementto act in its own
interests. (Heckscher, 1998: 4)
As Lazes and Savage further explain, under this model of "new unionism,"
)f hard bargaining that is a common
~cially with an industrial company
all negotiations, there would stilJ be
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these reports:
Unions must bargain for compensation tied to contributions that unions and workers
make. These contributions may be in the form of improved business results, reduced
total costs, reduced time to market, or the successful application of technology. Through
strategic alliances, unions must fundamentally change the work systems of their
workplaces, induding work structure, decision-making and the use of technology.
(Lazes and Savage, 1997: 185)
This model appears to advocate a form of enterprise unionism, with
labor organizations more closely allied with company interests than those of
their larger union (Juravich, 1998). It is based on the notion that the major
avenue for power for workers and their unions in a global marketplace is
Primarily through the employer, not union power through the withholding of
labor, buildmg of solidarity, and other activities associated with a more
traditional model of collective bargainmg. What is strikingly absent from these
~iscussions of "new unionism" is the development or growth of union power
ll1dependentof the employer.
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This mutual gains model is based on several assumptions about
employer behavior. First and most important, it assumes that businesses act in
rational ways to maximize their own self-interest. As a corollary, it also
assumes that there is an alignment of human resource policy and practices with
business strategies (Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Wright and McMahan, 1992).
So not only does the firm as a whole act rationally, but the actions of its
individual units are consistent across the firm.
The Rubberworkers were clearly operating under this model of "new
unionism" at Bridgestone/Firestone. They assumed that through their active
participation in the Partnership for Involvement program and the myriad of other
new work schemes that were being introduced at the various
Bridgestone/Firestone plants, they were securing their future with the company.
Because many ofthe programs arose from the Japanese side of the firm, workers
were especially convinced that this alignment with the larger corporation would
assure them a strong future with Bridgestone/Firestone.
Yet, the Rubberworkers and their members found that these HRM/LR .
strategies and activities on the shop floor at Bridgestone/Firestone were entirely
independent of the company's larger business practices. At the same time that
the company was pursuing a cooperative strategy partnering with the workforce
on the shop floor, it was developing a national tire industry strategy to
completely undermine the union and the pattern agreement. Mike O'Connor,
now president of the Akron Bridgestone/Firestone local, was one of the URW's
most ardent supporters in the early days of the Employee Incentive Program.
But it soon became apparent to O'Connor and others like him that the "emperor
had no clothes":
I was actuallyone of the instructorsin what they calledTQC. We taught the Demingand
Kaisan theories. I was the only hourly person-I was an officer of the union too-who
was selected to go to the instructorschool, and then I would teach a class once a week
with a salaried guy. Quite frankly, in the beginning I thought this was kind of a neat
concept. I really got kind of involved in it. I was all for it. But then, they never
employedit. It was all smokeand mirrors.They'd put it togetherabout halfwayandthen
dropped it. I mean, this TQC was a big to-do, then afternegotiationsin '91 that wasthe
end of that. They backed out and nothing carneof it. They left an empty room. They
didn't believe any conceptsat all. (O'Connor interview,1999:2)
As Melman pointed out almost two decades ago, in modem global
corporations the goal of maximizing profits is frequently not aligned with
rational behavior in the marketplace (Melman, 1983). As we have witnessed in
the wreckage of companies such as Eastern Airlines and Simplicity Patterns and
whole industries such as footwear and consumer electronics, often profitable
companies making quality products were destroyed because it was more
profitable to break them up, sell them, or laden them with debt until they
collapsed (Barlett and Steele, 1992). As capital has become more global, we
should not assume that some invisible hand is guiding it to some higher purpose.
Particularly during this era in which the interests of venture capital loom much
larger than the long-term profits, productivity, product quality, or the focus on
production of specific items, it is a leap of faith to assume that workers and their
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:ionally, but the actions of its
unions should place their future in human resources policies and practices.
However enlightened, these practices are often inconsequential to the fmancial
wizards of global capital.
Furthermore, it is important to explore the consequences of this
enterprise-based unionism. First, as Parker and others have suggested, at the
shop-floor level a cooperative approach often blurs lines between the company
and union, particularly when key union officials are assigned as team leaders or
facilitators reporting to management (Parker, 1985). While this new loyalty to
the company may facilitate the success of these kinds of programs, it may also
make more confrontational unionism less possible or effective. Similarly, a
focus on company-based issues may also isolate one or more local unions from
the larger national unions. Particularly when formal or informal pattern
agreements are involved, this overemphasis on the enterprise may strain
relationships and diminish the capacity of the larger national union organization
(Juravich, 1998). Confronted with the failure of this type of cooperative model,
the Rubberworkers and later the Steelworkers with which they merged were
determined to employ a very different approach to gaining power in the global
marketplace.
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In the wake of the bitter negotiations with the La Vergne local, contract
negotiations for the ftve major locals of Bridgestone/Firestone began on March
21, 1994. The company came with a comprehensive proposal overflowing with
concession demands. Their proposal began by radically altering the
compensation system with a perfonnance-based pay system linking wage
increases to specified productivity targets. Balfour, et aI., explain: "The
company also wanted to eliminate paid union time; implement a considerably
lower base wage rate; eliminate daily overtime payment and double-time
payment for work on Sunday; impose a four crew/twelve hour fixed/seven day
continuous operations schedule; implement major take-a-ways in health care
coverage; and su~iect employees to a no-fault attendance program" (Balfour et
aI., 1999: 17).
.
That spring, the union and company met more than 40 times in
bargaining sessions, but little progress was made. When the contract expired
April 23, 1994, the union continued working without a contract, still hoping that,
if it just kept bargaining, Bridgestone/Firestone would eventually move and it
could reach a fair agreement. But no matter how many times the union
attempted to work through the major issues, the company held firm to its
original comprehensive proposal. Former URW president Ken Coss describes
the process:
We c.ouldn't get them to put forth any priorities. They had proposals, and they were such
drasticp~oposalsfor the industry. It would have taken all of the uniformthings that we
had an~Just destroyedall of them. When we had the meeting,I said, "Chuck, if there's
somethmgin there that makesthe differencewhetheryou're goingto surviveor not we'll
takea look at it locationby location,you have to set priorities." He said,"We don't have
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any priorities. We want all of it." And 1said, "But you know that that's not something
that can happen. We want to avoid a strike." And he said, "Well, nobodylikes the idea,
but we think we're going to have to have one so the people will hurt badly enough that
they're willingto giveus what we want." (Coss interview,1999:7)
That June, the union reached the first tire industry agreement, settling with
Goodyear for a package that included a 16 percent wage increase over three
years. The union designated the Goodyear agreement as the pattern for the
industry, but as it promised, Bridgestone/Firestone, along with three smaller
companies, Pirelli, Yokohama, and Sumitomo, rejected the pattern.
After continuing negotiations through the summer, the union finally
gave the company a five-day strike notice on July 7. No progress was made,
and on July 12, 1994, more than 4,000 Bridgestone/Firestone workers from five
URW locals in Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, and Oklahoma went out on strike.
A full complement of replacement workers was quickly brought in and
management and salaried workers were reassigned to production jobs. .
Bridgestone/Firestone also imported tires from its Japanese plant to fill orders.
On August 18, 1994, the company declared an impasse and implemented its
final offer.
Unlike the Steelworkers and many other national unions that have
established strike support structures and systems to assist local unions that go
out on strike, the URW had little more to offer than $100 per week in strike
benefits. Each of the locals had already made traditional strike preparations,
organizing picket captains and cautioning its membership to build up their
savings. But now it was up to the locals to establish whatever support systems
they could to hold the striking workers and their families together, from discount
groceries and family support groups to rallies and demonstrations outside the
plants.
While the bargaining teams met sporadically over the fall, sometimes
under the supervision of a federal mediator, no progress was made. On
December 27, 1994, Bridgestone/Firestone's president Kaizaki announced that
"he can crush" the now six-month-old strike, firing and permanently replacing
more than 2,000 of the striking workers (Balfour et aI., 1999: 36). In a
devastating blow to the struggle, Local 7 in Akron broke ranks and returned to
work, as did many of its counterparts at the other plants. Fearing the permanent
loss of their jobs, by the end of the year more than one-fifth of the strikers had
crossed the picket lines and returned to work.
The strike was quickly draining the financial reserves of the
Rubberworkers, which was also coordinating strikes at Pirelli, Armstrong,
Dunlop, and Yokohamo Tire. Fully 10 percent of their membership was on
strike and, after paying out more than U.S.$12 million in strike funds, the
Rubberworkers were near financial ruin. As a stopgap measure, a special
convention approved a dues increase to keep the union solvent.
In addition to trying to get bargaining back on track, the
Rubberworkers and their members attempted to bring pressure on the company
through a boycott effort. Early targets were Sears, a major retailer of Firestone
tires, and the MasterCare Centers, which are directly owned by
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impasse and implemented its
BridgestonelFirestone. Yet clearly, the union was unable to mount a more
comprehensive campaign necessary to bring Bridgestone/Firestone back to the
table. As Doug Niehouse, former staffer from the Industrial Union Department
of the AFL-CIO, suggests, "The reality was that the Rubberworkers just didn't
have the resources or the people that were capable of doing the work" (Niehouse
interview, 1999: J).
The union was forced to borrow heavily from the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the United
Automobile Workers (VAW) to keep the strike going, but its prospects for
success, nonetheless, remained dim. By late spring 1995, it was becoming clear
that labor's traditional model of bargaining in good faith and waiting for the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to deliver justice, which
the DRWand other industrial unions had relied on for decades, was no longer
effective in the global economy. With members crossing the picket lines and
returning to work, the Rubberworkers needed new ideas and different strategies,
else the strike and most likely the entire union would be lost.
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amities together, from discount
md demonstrations outside the
THE MERGER OF THE URW AND USWA: THE BffiTH
OF A NEW CAMPAIGN
It is no accident that the URW looked to the USWA as a candidate for
merger. Like the Rubberworkers, the Steelworkers had lost almost half oftheir
membership during the 1970s and 1980s. The Steelworkers had also been one
of the early industrial unions to jump on board with cooperative programs and
new management initiatives, with their Labor Management Participation Teams
(Call1ens, 1985). Just as the URW had experienced at Bridgestone/Firestone, the
labor-management programs in steel did little to stop the hemorrhaging of jobs
in the industry-
By the time of the Bridgestone/Firestone strike, the Steelworkers had
stabilized their ranks and were building their comeback using a very different
model. The approach began in 1986 with the strike at USX but became full-
blown in a campaign in a small town in West Virginia. The aluminum plant in
Ravenswood, West Virginia, had been spun off from Kaiser Aluminum and
purchased through a leveraged buyout by a group of investors that included a
former plant manager. As safety conditions worsened in the plant, where jobs
were being speeded up and combined, the company essentially refused to
bargain with the union, forcing a lockout on October 30, 1990. Three months
later, with injunctions preventing little more than symbolic picketing and the
plant running near capacity with a full complement of replacement workers, it
looked like another long~drawn-out defeat for labor.
However, the Steelworkers, under the leadership of then vice president
George Becker, turned the call1paign around and developed a strategic campaign
of unprecedented scope and intensity against Ravenswood Aluminum
Corporation. This was not just a simple corporate campaign or a boycott but a
multifaceted strategy based on extensive research that slowly unraveled a
complex global ownership network of bankers, investors, and fmanciers. For
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the next 17 months, the Steelworkers, their members, and trade unionists across
the globe mounted a spirited campaign that ultimately brought a decent contract
for all 1,700 oftheir members.
On July 1, 1995 the RubberworkerlSteelworker merger was approved
at a special convention in Pittsburgh. The more than 100,000 members of the
URW, a significant number of them currently on strike, were now
'
part of the
USWA. Unlike many union mergers, where each of the former entities keeps its
structure intact, the USW A knew that it would need to integrate the
Rubberworkers more closely if it had any chance of winning at
Bridgestone/Firestone. Jim English, assistant to the president of the USW A,
describes what happened:
We've created an RPIC (Rubber and Plastics Industry Council) division. The RPIC
division has responsibilities for coordinating bargaining, holding conferences, but the
servicing all takes place within the context of the geographic districts of the union. I
think that's significant in terms of Bridgestone/Firestone because what it meant was that
the Bridgestone/Firestone locals were attending all of the same conferences that the
Steelworkers' locals were during that period of time. They were very much brought into'
the life of the union. Had they remained as a separate entity, I don't think you would
have had quite the same enthusiasm and commitment. (English interview, 1999: 21)
As part of the merger talks, the URW and the USWA had decided in
late May to make an unconditional offer to return to work. Amid fear of
decertification, the Decatur local had voted earlier in the month to return to
work. More than one-quarter of its members had already closed the line and
returned to work. After the return to work offer, however, only 153 of the
remaining 2,400 workers were called back to work. In the wake of their huge
victory at Ravenswood, the Steelworkers were not ready to admit defeat. But, to
win, the USW A knew that it would have to take the campaign to the next level.
The Campaign Goes Global
The Steelworkers had learned four important lessons from Ravenswood
and the campaigns that followed (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). First
was the importance of research in understanding how power flowed in a
corporation and, in turn, for identifYing as many vulnerabilities as possible.
Second, in the words of George Becker, the emphasis must be on constant
"escalation";
The last thing I wanted that company to think about before [they] went to bed at night,
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, is all the
problems and difficulties we caused them that day. And the first thing I wanted them to
think of when they woke up is, oh, Christ, I've got to go out and face them sons of
bitches again. We had to get them thinking about the Steelworkers continually, every
day. If we let an hour go by that our name didn't cross their minds for some reason or
another, then we were failing. (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1999: 132)
Third, the union could not run a campaign of the scope and scale
necessary to win by relying on existing staff and resources. A comprehensive
global campaign like the one that they were beginning at Bridgestone/Firestone
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would take money, staff, and the involvement of thousands of their members,
their families, and their allies. Fourth and fmally, these campaigns could not be
won by strategy and resources alone. They also depended on the determination,
militancy, and solidarity of the strikers, their families, and their communities.
Following a model that the union had utilized in the Ravenswood
campaign, Becker assembled a strategy team to coordinate the research and to
use what they found in the research to develop both short-term tactics and a
long-term strategy. The team included key leaders and staff from both the
USWA and the former URW, as wen as the Industrial Union Department (IUD)
of the AFL-CIO. Jerry Fernandez, who had played a leading role in the
Ravenswood international campaign, was appointed the overall USW A
coordinator.
In June 1995, in perhaps the largest commitment of an American union
in a strategic campaign, the USWA hired more than 50 boycott coordinators
from each of the USW A districts. Rather than having boycott activities added to
a long list of duties, their full-time job was to organize the boycott. For the first
time since July 1994, the boycott would have dedicated staff support. This
decentralized strategy of tapping already existing leadership in their
communities also allowed the Steelworkers to involve a great number of their
members.
In addition, as in the Ravenswood campaign, the union filed a massive
list of health and safety, environmental, and NLRB charges. But unlike at
Ravenswood, at BridgestonelFirestone 1,000 union members had returned to
work inside the struck plants (under conditions that some described as a "living
hell"), and thousands of other USWAlURW members were working under
extended contracts at BridgestonelFirestone plants not part of the strike. Hence,
in addition to the external campaign, the union launched a full-scale in-plant
campaign, replete with solidarity days, mass grievances, phone and fax jamming
of corporate offices, and escalating work-to-rule actions and slowdowns.
Based on their experience, however, Fernandez and the rest of the
strategy team understood that the fight could not be won on American shores
alone. Once the strategy team was established, they decided to move quickly in
sending a delegation of strikers and their famiJies to Japan to meet with labor,
religious, and civil rights organizations. Fernandez remembers,
I wantedto put a human face to the strike. I wanted the Japanese to understand the
suffering. I wanted the Japanesepeople and workersand unions to understandthat they
had essentially fired 2700 people. In these Lypesof things you can'L send officials of the
union or paid professionals to do that kind of thing. You have to put a face to the
struggle. (Fernandez interview, 1999: 5)
The decision having been made, the USWA and IUD realized that they had few
connections to the Japanese labor movement. Rengo, the largest labor
~ederation in Japan, did not want to get involved, but the USW A made an
Important link with a smaner, more militant labor organization, Zenrokyo.
Yet, just as plans for the trip to Japan began to come together, things
seemed to unravel. On July 17, during a union protest involving 500 strikers
and their supporters outside the Japanese embassy in Washington, a protester
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was photographed with a sign bearing the words, "Enola Gay, one more time."
Featured in newspapers aU over Japan, this display proved too offensive to bear
for the Japanese unionists whom the Steelworkers were courting (Balfour et at,
1999: 47). Becker sent a personal apology, and the strategy teams made a
commitment to stop the anti-Japanese sentiments that had been simmering
below the surface since the strike began.
Despite the initial tensions with the Japanese unions, the visit of 12
strikers and family members in early September 1995 was an impressive
success. Although refused a meeting with Kaizaki, they held a number of
demonstrations with Japanese trade unionists and received tremendous media
coverage. In the aftermath of the embassy debacle, Zenrokyo suggested that the
workers' delegation visit Hiroshima and the Peace Park. As Balfour et ai.
explain, "The visit demonstrated, if in a smaU way, that the Steelworkers were
not narrowly bent on pursuing their agenda to the exclusion of some of the
greater issues of the campaign, namely tolerance and solidarity" (Balfour et aI.,
1999: 51). A second delegation of workers and their families returned in
October 1995 to sustain the pressure.
Working with the ICEM (the Brussels-based International Federation
of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions), the Steelworkers
returned to Europe in November 1995. In Brussels they picketed Bridgestone's
European regional headquarters and went on from there to meet with
Bridgestone union officials and workers in Madrid and Rome. Back at home the
big news was that on January 31, 1996, the NLRB issued a formal complaint
against Bridgestone/Firestone on eight counts, including illegally discharging
strikers by falsely claiming that they were permanently replaced. A week later,
a second complaint pushed the company's back-pay liability back to January
1995. The campaign was gaining momentum.
Almost immediately after the board decision, the USWA, ICEM, and
the IUD pulled together a "World Conference for the Bridgestone Corporation"
just outside Bridgestone/Firestone's lavish headquarters in Nashville,
Tennessee. Held March 13 and 14, 1996, the conference brought together 65
union delegates from across the world. In the words ofUSWA's Becker, "We
intend to develop a global union workers' action plan to counter this company's
growing disregard for its workers' interests, and its exploitation of the
economies of both Third World and industrially developed nations" (Balfour et
aI., 1999: 71). A number of international guests spoke, including representatives
from Rengo, who, after the second trip to Japan, were now actively and publicly
supporting the Steelworkers' effort. At the conclusion of the conference,
delegates were joined by more than 1,000 union members as they marched to
Bridgestone/Firestone's headquarters. After the rally, Steelworkers marched
across the street and set up what would become Camp Justice.
Originally designed as a short-term media event, Camp Justice
developed into a full-fledged campground, occupied and visited by thousands of
trade unionists from around the world. Each day, rain or shine, there was a
daily march on the plant by rank-and-file Bridgestone/Firestone workers and
visiting trade union delegations. That spring, the boycott campaign picked up
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lYproved too offensive to bear
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1d the strategy teams made a
nts that had been simmering
steam as well. On May 14, 1996, at a news conference at AFL-CIO
headquarters in Washington, D.C., USWA president Becker announced that the
union was going to escalate its handbilling campaign to target hundreds of tire
retailers nationwide, as well as to "black-flag,,2 BridgestonelFirestone at the
1996 Indy 500, the Cleveland Grand Prix, and other auto races (Balfour et
al.,] 999: 79).
In the weeks that followed, USW A locals, under the leadership of the
boycott coordinators, picketed and handbilled thousands of MasterCare and
Sears tire retailers across the country. Several high-profile successes followed,
whereby tire retailers posted announcements that they would no longer sell
Firestone tires. The boycott campaign also targeted GM-Saturn and Ford, state
and local governments, and pro-labor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
remove Bridgestone/Firestone tires trom their vehicles. The effort paid off
when, in July 1996, GM-Saturn announced that customers could have
Bridgestone/Firestone tires replaced on new Saturn vehicles, ftee of charge.
Several states and municipalities offered their support, including a strong
resolution trom the Alabama House of Representatives "in unequivocal support"
of the USWA and a commitment ftom the Atlantic City Council not to purchase
Bridgestone/Firestone tires.
The boycott effort, however, was most intense at the auto races, starting
with the Indy 500 on May 26. Action started weeks before the race with
handbilling, rallies, balloons, marches, and a "black flag" motorcycle brigade.
On the day of the race, ,more than 1,200 Steelworkers were at the race to
handbill inside and outside the track and to pass out thousands of "Black Flag
Firestone" flags. In the weeks that followed, the USW A black-flagged
Bridgestone/Firestone at auto races in Brooklyn, Michigan; Cleveland, Ohio;
and Toronto, Canada.
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As the two-year anniversary of the strike approached in early July, the
USWA escalation strategy was beginning to take its toll on
Bridgestone/Firestone on multiple ftonts, locally and internationally.
Determined to push even harder, the strategy team decided to plan for its
"International Days of Outrage" to commemorate the anniversary of the strike.
The hope was to have multiple events in Japan, the United States, Latin
America, and Europe in the days surrounding the strike aimiversary. In Japan, a
delegation of workers from Des Moines and Decatur took part in a "Conference
for the Solidarity of U.S. Bridgestone/Firestone USWA Workers" with leaders
from the ICEM, Rengo and Tekko Roren affiliates. The assembled unions at the
conference passed a unanimous resolution in support of the strikers, condemning
Bridgestone for "breaking away trom pattern bargaining, hiring union-busters,
permanently replacing employees, and making unacceptable proposals in
bargaining" and calling on the company to "settle a fair contract, and to comply
with NLRB rulings by rehiring all strikers and compensating them with back
pay" (Balfour et ai., 1999: 96-97).
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Another worker delegation traveled to Europe, where union leaders
from Spain, France, and Italy drafted similarly forceful resolutions condemning
Bridgestone/Firestone and pledging their solidarity with the striking workers. In
Turkey, a U.S. striker, Pedro DeLeon, was brought into the plant by the
Bridgestone union Lastik-Is. "Once inside, the workers stopped production,
jumped up on tables, and held an impromptu rally on the shop floor", (Balfour, et
aI., 1999: 104).
This was followed by a series of solidarity work stoppages and rallies
at Goodyear, Pirelli, Michelin, and Bridgestone plants in Brazil, Argentina, and
Venezuela. Back in the United States the strike anniversary was commemorated
through a series of rallies at Bridgestone/Firestone's Nashville headquarters.
Around the globe, unions and labor supporters also joined in a "cyberpicket"
against Bridgestone/Firestone whereby, through a link on the ICEM Web page,
thousands of supporters could pass on their outrage directly to Bridgestone
management, flooding the company with E-mail messages.
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Finally, Bridgestone/Firestone had had enough. The scope and impact
of the combined internal and external campaign had been staggering:
3.6 million handbills, nearly a million "Don't Buy Bridgestone/Firestone" stickers and
bumper stickers, 250,000 campaign buttons, 115,000 small black flags, and 15,000
"Don't Buy" T-shirts were distributed; 63,000 yard signs were displayed. Thousands of
separate campaign events involved over 60,000 USWA participants and volunteers; 1,100
separate USWA locals were actively involved. Camp Justice was occupied for 246 days;
the campaign reached 86 countries, including 16 visited by replaced
Bridgestone/Firestone workers; and 43 foreign workers visited the U.S. to lend their
support. ("One Day Longer." 1997: 14)
The company came back to the bargaining table on October 28, 1996,
ready to reach an agreement. On November 4, 1996, after 72 hours of
uninterrupted bargaining, a tentative agreement was reached on all economic
and noneconomic issues. With the exception of maintaining 12-hour shifts and
the elimination of paid hours for union health and safety work, the settlement
included major gains on almost every issue that had prompted the strike.
Moreover, reinstatement was won for all union members, including all but four
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Settlement
All throughout the summer and fall, the international campaign, the
boycott, and.the local actions continued. Local union delegations traveled again
to Japan and Latin America, and in late August 1996 a delegation of20 Japanese
trade unionists toured the United States in support of the strikers. On October
22, 1996, the USW A released "Running over the American Dream: A Case
Study in Corporate Greed and Irresponsibility." Translated into four languages,
the report was released worldwide, branding Bridgestone/Firestone as the
world's "poster child for corporate irresponsibility." Just a few weeks later, the
NLRB unfair labor practice hearing was due to open in Pittsburgh, along with
the ever-ticking back-pay time clock, which by then had reached millions of
dollars.
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of those discharged for strike-related misconduct. Perhaps most significant of
all, the new contract would expire simultaneously with other master agreements
in the industry. Against the greatest odds possible, the union had truly snatched
victory from certain defeat. In the words of University of Akron professor and
tire industry expert David Meyer, the union's accomplishment was "drop-dead,
jaw-to-the floor amazing" (Lessin, 1998: 68)
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AN EMERGING MODEL OF UNION POWER IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
While it may not be clear to the general public, over the past several
decades American labor has made important strides out of its nationalist and, at
times, jingoist past. "Buy American" campaigns and smashing Japanese cars
have been replaced by an antisweatshop movement that has not only ignited
college campuses but brought the plight of workers in developing countries into
America's living rooms and into the consciousness of U.S. union leaders and
members. The anticommunist International Labor Institutes of the AFL-CIO,
which had isolated the federation from significant portions of the international
labor community, have been abandoned, replaced by more workers' rights-
oriented Solidarity Centers (Shailor, 1998).
At the same time, individual unions that throughout the 1980s were
battered by plant closings, downsizing, whipsawing, and union busting have
become increasingly sophisticated and aggressive in both organizing and
contract campaigns. Central to many of these campaigns has been a global
strategy linking workers and unions together across borders. The
Communication Workers of America have built ongoing linkages and exchanges
witb British workers and unions in their efforts to organize the
telecommunications industry (Borgers, 1999). Cross-border union coalitions
were also an integral component of the Teamsters 1997 strike victory at United
Parcel Service (UPS) (Russo and Banks, 1999), and the United Electrical
Workers has established important connections to the independent Mexican
union, Frente Autentico del Trabajo, for mutual support in organizing and
contract struggles in both the United States and Mexico (UE, 2000). Faced by
the same kinds of global pressures, the graphical worker unions in Europe have,
likewise, embarked on cross-national coordination of union strategies (Chapter
13). But as discussed in the two preceding chapters, much more transnational
communication and coordination among unions are called for to strengthen
labor's hand in an increasingly integrated global economy.
With their victory at Bridgestone/Firestone, the Steelworkers
demonstrated once again that labor can win, even in a highly competitive and
uncertain global economy. In this and a string of victories that followed at
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel, Newport News, and Continental Tire in the United
States, the Steelworkers proved that these victories were neither exceptional
cases nor just lucky victories. These victories came not only against some of the
nation's largest industrial employers but also against some of the world's most
wealthy and powerful MNCs and financiers. Taken together, the Steelworkers'
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victories have provided an important model of unionism and trade union power
in the global economy. The new model rejects the model coming from strategic
management literature, suggesting that unions will gain power in the global
marketplace only by making themselves invaluable and economical to their
employers. Given the tremendous wage disparities that exist worldwide, it is
difficult to see how American unions could ever gain any real security for
themselves through bargaining away work rules and practices with their
employers. While there has been a lot of talk about employers' taking the "high
road" to economic success in developed economies, in reality, the "low road"
strategies continue to dominate (Harrison, 1994).
Rejecting this "new unionism," the Steelworkers have built their power
by directly confronting employers, using their members, their families, and
community supporters as their allies and government regulation for enforcement
of worker rights. But this is not a simple, old-fashioned model of confronting
employers on the picket line and in the courts. This model of strategic contract
campaigns is based on a thorough understanding of the structure and operation.
of global capital. Early in the twentieth century, the industrial giants seemed
invincible from the viewpoint of trade unionists primarily experienced in dealing
with local and regional employers. The CIO, nonetheless, found the leverage
points of these new industrial giants and, in turn, became ever more successful
in organizing them. Similarly, the victory at BridgestonelFirestone and the ones
that preceded and followed reveal that there are new opportunities for exercising
leverage in MNCs, a theme emphasized in Chapter 3. Global companies such as
Bridgestone/Firestone often have a very complex structure of management,
control, and fmances. Unlike privately held domestic fInns, all these various
players may in some way be vulnerable to union pressure. As the United Auto
Workers have discovered with just-in-time production systems, these new
corporate structures provide important new points of leverage.
Using this newfound understanding of global corporations, however,
was not only about relying on the time-honored practices of the labor
movement. The victory by the USWA called for bold new moves to reach
across borders, down to their members, and deep inside their own organization,
for the will and commitment to stay true to the union's purpose and values. As
we have seen, it wasn't easy, and sometimes they faltered.
But in the Bridgestone/Firestone campaign, the Steelworkers left that
past behind and created a different kind of new unionism that used the power of
coalition. They made bold moves to move beyond the easy and traditional
allies, forging relationships with environmental groups, international labor
organizations, and even members of the fInancial community. The USWA's
work with environmentalists as part of the Kaiser campaign and the alliances
that they are building in the wake of the WTO protests have not only brought the
Steelworkers closer to their allies but changed their allies in the process.
This model of strategic campaigns also understands that the work of
labor relations is not just about money and simple economic self-interest. While
successful strategic campaigns have to bring economic pressure to bear on a
variety of players, campaigns are not won by economics alone. In both
The Steelworkers' Global Car.
Ravenswood and Bridgestone
Steelworkers and their world
away, not ever, no matter hm
members, their families, and 1
took on new meaning in the C(
As we begin this ne,
corporate order will eve
BridgestonelFirestone will ne,
their unions to have a just plac
one, however, cannot be reduc
point to a new model of union
interests but allied with a broa
and citizens worldwide. T
Bridgestone/Firestone and mOl
NOTES
I. This project was
access to individuals and doci
analysis presented, herein, is
USWA documenting contract
1993 with our research documc
Aluminum (Juravich and Bron:
studies of campaigns at USX,
Allegheny Ludlum (Bronfenbfl
important context for our anal
part of this project, a longer c
Bridgestone/Firestone was co
Balfour and Sue McNeil and C
Bloom and Ben Francis-Fallon
report about the Bridgestone/Fi
2. In auto racing, a bIe
REFERENCES
Appelbaum, E., Bailey, T., Berg,
Advantage: Why High-Pc
University Press.
Balfour, J., Bloom, J., Francis-Fa
Steelworkers' Victory at
Barlett, D. L. and Steele, 1. B. (1S
Andrews and McMeeI.
Borgers, F. (1999). "Global Union
Alliance." Labor Studies
"Bridgestone/Firestone Fact Sheet
document.
Human Resource Strategies The Steelworkers' Global Campaign at Bridgestone/Firestone 265
nism and trade union power
nodel coming trom strategic
1 gain power in the global
Ie and economical to their
s that exist worldwide, it is
. gain any real security for
s and practices with their
. employers' taking the "high
:s, in reality, the "low road"
Ravenswood and Bridgestone/Firestone, settlements were achieved because the
Steelworkers and their worldwide allies made it clear that they would not go
away, not ever, no matter how long it took. The commitment of the union, its
members, their families, and their communities to win, whatever it would take,
took on new meaning in the context of this new global strategic campaign.
As we begin this new millennium, it is not clear how this new global
corporate order will evolve. Victories in campaigns such as
Bridgestone/Firestone will need to become far more common for workers and
their unions to have a just place in the world that is emerging. Victories like this
one, however, cannot be reduced to a few winning battles in a losing war. They
point to a new model of unionism, one not contingent on allegiance to corporate
interests but allied with a broad coalition of workers, unions, environmentalists,
and citizens worldwide. That is the real promise of what happened at
Bridgestone/Firestone and more broadly in Seattle.
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1. This project was funded by the USW A, which provided unfettered
access to individuals and documents related to the strike and campaign. The
analysis presented, herein, is part of a multiyear research project with the
USWA documenting contract victories in the 1980s and 1990s that began in
1993 with our research documenting the Steelworkers campaign at Ravenswood
Aluminum (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1999). It continued in 1998 with case
studies of campaigns at USX, NIPSCO, WCI, Wheeling Pitt, Bayou Steel, and
Allegheny Ludlum (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998). These studies provide
important context for our analysis of the Bridgestone/Firestone campaign. As
part of this project, a longer case study documenting the USW A campaign at
Bridgestone/Firestone was compiled by Umass Labor Center students Jeff
Balfour and Sue McNeil and Cornell industrial and labor relations students Jen
Bloom and Ben Francis-Fallon. We also relied on Nancy Lessin's unpublished
report about the Bridgestone/Firestone struggle.
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